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Summary: This article looks upon the most recent developments in the 
European Union’s accession strategies, as from the start of accession 
negotiations. It fi rst seeks to demonstrate that the pre-accession con-
ditionality rationale of stabilising present and protecting future inte-
gration objectives underpins the so-called ‘specifi c safeguard clauses’ 
of the 2003 and 2005 Acts of Accession and the latter’s cooperation 
and verifi cation mechanism, accordingly referred to as post-accession 
conditionality tools. It then argues that this rationale, emphasised 
also in the imperative of maintaining the momentum of European in-
tegration of the Union’s ‘integration capacity’, above all necessitates 
effective compliance with EU law, and thus full administrative and 
judicial capacity of (prospective) Member States. Indeed, the lynchpin 
of these new conditionality devices evokes putting them in the wider 
context of compliance mechanisms in the enlarged European Union. It 
thereby becomes apparent how conditionality has lead to a consider-
able empowerment of the European Commission which, when reach-
ing into the post-accession phase, entails a problematic differentiation 
between the Member States. Conditionality methodology furthermore, 
and this is equally shown, has had an impact on the Commission’s 
role as ‘guardian of the treaty’ within the overall system of ensuring 
compliance with EU law. 
I. Introduction
A strategy of reinforcement by reward, commonly referred to as 
‘positive conditionality’ underpins many of the European Union’s foreign-
policy tools. While not a new concept in international relations, positive 
conditionality has only begun to take shape within the European agenda 
throughout the last two decades,1 and ‘entails the linking, by a state or 
∗ Martina Spernbauer, Doctoral Researcher, Department of Law, European University In-
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1  In international relations, it is described as the use by a state, a regional or an interna-
tional body of political, diplomatic and economic instruments and policies in order to infl u-
ence the internal and external policies of a third state. It has been argued that the collapse 
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international organisation, of benefi ts desired by another state to the ful-
fi lment of certain conditions’.2 The extensive use of various incentives, 
ranging from development assistance to contractual and institutional ties, 
predicates the general transformative power of Europe upon third coun-
tries’ policy decisions and legislative developments. Yet, the specifi city of 
the nature and content of these incentives in a particular case, as well as 
the ways in which they are linked to the policy choice desired, which in 
turn depend on the specifi c relationship with the third country in question, 
make conditionality hard to describe in exhaustive and concrete terms.
While corresponding to a policy choice in external relations proper, 
the concept of conditionality stands out as the indispensable rationale 
of the European Union’s pre-accession strategy. The setting of strin-
gent membership conditions is designed to attain an objective that is 
essentially two-fold: on the one hand, the Copenhagen criteria and the 
continuous, ‘objective’ evaluation of candidate countries’ progress based 
thereupon allow for the maintenance of the ‘inclusive nature of the acces-
sion process’3 while nonetheless accommodating differentiation between 
the candidates based on ‘individual merits’; on the other hand, accession 
conditionality seeks stabilisation of present, and protection of future, in-
tegration objectives.4 
Consequently, the protection of the level of integration reached, which 
is measurable in quantity and quality through the acquis, does not al-
low for a renegotiation of membership conditions but requires a strategy 
whereby the aspiring members adopt and implement the acquis in its en-
tirety. Indeed, an increasingly high degree of conditionality and its rigorous 
application are directly linked to expanding membership obligations. Ful-
fi lling the obligations of membership in an ‘ever closer Union’ is, in general, 
increasingly diffi cult - for current and future member states alike.
In legal academic literature, the ramifi cations of the European Un-
ion’s fi fth enlargement are frequently examined in terms of the processes 
and constitutional implications of approximation to EU law within the 
acceding states. This paper proposes a different focus. It is an endeavour 
of the USSR marked a turning point as during the Cold War what was generally referred to 
as ‘linkage’ was used mostly as a policy tool in the context of the bipolar confrontation. Cf 
E Lannon, E Haenebalcke and K Inglis, ‘The Many Faces of EU Conditionality in Pan-Euro-
Mediterranean Relations’ in E Lannon and M Maresceau (eds), The EU’s Enlargement and 
Mediterranean Strategies: A Comparative Analysis (Palgrave, London 2001).
2  K Smith, ‘The Evolution and Application of EU Membership Conditionality’ in M Cre-
mona, The Enlargement of the European Union (OUP, Oxford 2003) 105, 108.
3  December 1999 Helsinki European Council Conclusions. In the aftermath of the Kosovo 
crisis, Turkey was granted ‘candidate status’, while the start of accession negotiations with 
the ‘second wave’ of the Central and Eastern European Countries, namely Slovakia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Bulgaria and Romania as well as Malta was decided.
4  Cf Smith (n 2) 106.
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to determine the possible impact of accession conditionality upon the 
European Union itself, arguing that its very rationale of protecting the 
achievements and maintaining the momentum of European integration is 
put at risk by the use of conditionality in the way the latter has evolved, 
and by demonstrating that its new forms increasingly blur the borderline 
between members and non-members. The important underlying premise 
is that, with the European model of integration primarily following an 
approach of integration through law, maintaining the ‘momentum of in-
tegration’ depends on the effective enforcement of European Union law. 
The latter in turn requires effi cient cooperation of national courts and 
administrative authorities. 
The objective thus referred to lends itself to a structure that is es-
sentially two-fold. It seems appropriate to trace, in a fi rst part, the most 
recent developments with regard to the European Union’s concept of 
conditionality. Conditionality has indeed undergone a somewhat three-
dimensional evolution. In the fi rst place, there is now an extensive use 
of membership conditionality with respect to third countries which have 
not yet applied for membership, let alone started accession negotiations. 
This is particularly the case in the framework of the Stabilisation and 
Association Process.5 The countries of the Western Balkans, merely hav-
ing been granted potential candidate status,6 are subject to European 
Partnerships7 - and consequently are working towards compliance with 
political and economic membership criteria according to a pre-deter-
mined agenda, even in the absence of contractual ties. For eventual es-
tablishment of the latter, the Union insists that these countries make 
‘credible headway’ in complying with the political Copenhagen criterion.8 
Subsequently, a satisfactory track-record in implementing Stabilisation 
and Association Agreement obligations is a pre-requisite for the EU to 
consider an application for membership. While this kind of pre-pre-acces-
5  Cf ‘Conclusions on the Principle of Conditionality Governing the Development of the 
European Union’s Relations with Certain Countries of South-East Europe’ Bulletin EU 4-
1997, establishing a ‘graduated approach’.
6  Cf 2002 Feira European Council Conclusions. In a joint declaration issued after the 
Thessaloniki EU-Western Balkans Summit, they were declared an ‘integral part of unifi ed 
Europe.’ ‘Declaration of the Thessaloniki EU-Western Balkans Summit’ (21 June 2003) EU 
Doc 10229/03, 5.
7  Based on Council Regulation 533/2004 on the establishment of European partnerships 
in the framework of the stabilisation and association process [2004] OJ L 86/1. Unlike 
Council Regulation 622/98, which provided the basis for the CEEC Accession Partnerships 
and was adopted by virtue of Art 308 ECT, this regulation fi nds its legal basis in Art 181a 
(2) ECT. Cf also K Inglis, ‘EU Enlargement - Membership Conditions applied to Future and 
Potential Member States’ in K Inglis and A Ott, The Constitution for Europe and an Enlarging 
Union: Unity in Diversity? (Europa Law Publishing, Groningen 2005). 
8  One cannot omit to mention at this point that the benchmarks used for opening nego-
tiations on a Stabilisation and Association Agreement are the same as those identifi ed in 
the Commission’s positive opinion for opening accession negotiations in its Agenda 2000 
country opinions. Cf Inglis (n 7). 
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sion conditionality is undoubtedly worth looking at, the confi nes of the 
present contribution do not allow for its in-depth analysis. It is thus pro-
posed to limited the analytical timeframe to the period after the start of 
accession negotiations. The second evolutionary dimension with respect 
to the use of conditionality concerns the way in which conditionality in-
creasingly operates more openly throughout the pre-accession process: 
a tool of ‘benchmarking’, introduced in the context of the adoption of the 
negotiating frameworks for Croatia and Turkey, is applied for the open-
ing and closure of each individual negotiating chapter. Furthermore, a 
new chapter ‘Judiciary and Fundamental Rights’ allows for issues which 
were previously addressed under the political Copenhagen criterion and 
whose respect was thus a pre-requisite for the start of negotiations, to 
be decisive for progress in negotiations as such. Thirdly, conditionality 
now reaches into the post-accession period by virtue of specifi c safeguard 
clauses provided for in the Acts of Accession of 2003 and 2005, with the 
latter being reinforced by ‘cooperation and verifi cation mechanisms in 
the area of judicial reform and the fi ght against organised crime and cor-
ruption’, endorsed by the Council in October 2006. 
In a second part, the consequences of these new dimensions of ac-
cession conditionality, in particular within the overall system of ensur-
ing compliance with EU law, will be refl ected upon. Therein, it will be 
demonstrated how conditionality - in procedural terms - has led to a 
considerable empowerment of the European Commission. Indeed, the 
‘guardian of the Treaties’ no longer merely has a central role in ensuring 
the enforcement of Community law, it also has acquired a pivotal position 
throughout the entire pre- accession process that increasingly - through 
these new mechanisms - reaches into the post-accession phase. In addi-
tion, considering that the lynchpin of these new devices is found in the 
institutional aspects of ‘the ability to take on the obligations of member-
ship’, merely taken to a different stage in the course of the accession 
process, a closer look will be given to the imperative of ‘full administrative 
and judicial capacity’ of prospective member states. 
II. Membership conditionality in new disguise: benchmarking, 
safeguard provisions, and the cooperation and verifi cation 
mechanism
Within the framework of analysis set out above, it is proposed to 
consider the new developments in EU membership conditionality chrono-
logically in the context of accession negotiations. The introduction of the 
concept of ‘benchmarking’ will be examined fi rst , then the new so-called 
‘specifi c safeguard clauses’ introduced in the 2003 Act of Accession9 and 
9  ‘Act concerning the conditions of accession of the Czech Republic, the Republic of Esto-
nia, the Republic of Cyprus, the Republic of Latvia, the Republic of Lithuania, the Republic 
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the Protocol concerning the conditions and arrangements for admission of 
the Republic of Bulgaria and Romania10 (henceforth 2005 Act of Accession) 
will be examined, before attempting to conceptualise the cooperation and 
verifi cation mechanisms which entered into force on 1 January 2007.
First, a few preliminary lines on what is rightly considered the fun-
damental basis and lasting reference point of the current pre-accession 
strategies, the 1993 Copenhagen criteria, are appropriate, as the neces-
sity for their ‘permanent adaptation’11 and their progressive procedural 
and substantive clarifi cation illustrates the inherently evolving nature of 
EU membership conditionality, which is functional to its very purpose. 
Naturally, what follows will necessarily be highly selective, based upon 
their relevance for the current contribution.12 
After declaring that the ‘associated countries in Central and Eastern 
Europe that so desire shall become members of the European Union’, the 
European Council established the well-known conditions, encompass-
ing political, economic, ‘acquis’ and ‘absorption capacity’ criteria.13 Be-
ing vague in substance, the conclusions were similarly so in procedural 
terms, merely stating that the ‘European Council [would] continue to fol-
low closely the progress in each associated country towards fulfi lling the 
of Hungary, the Republic of Malta, the Republic of Poland, the Republic of Slovenia and 
the Slovak Republic and the adjustments to the Treaties on which the European Union is 
founded’ [2003] OJ L236/33.
10  ‘Protocol concerning the conditions and arrangements for admission of the Republic of 
Bulgaria and Romania to the European Union’ [2005] OJ L157/11. 
11  M Maresceau, ‘The EU pre-accession strategies: a political and legal analysis’ in M 
Maresceau and E Lannon (eds), The EU’s Enlargement and Mediterranean Strategies: A 
Comparative Analysis (Palgrave, London 2001).
12  A great number of these, in particular with reference to the Western Balkan countries, 
will thus have to be left out. For further reference, see eg Inglis (n 7) 242ff.
13  Under the Copenhagen criteria, membership requires that the candidate country en-
sures:
1. the stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and 
respect for and protection of minorities: political criteria.
2. the existence of a functional market economy as well as the capacity to cope with com-
petitive pressure and market forces within the Union: economic criteria.
3. the ability to take on the obligations of membership including adherence to the aims of 
political, economic and monetary union: acquis criterion. Cited by the Commission in Euro-
pean Commission, ‘Towards the Enlarged Union: Strategy Paper and Report of the Europe-
an Commission on the progress towards accession by each of the candidate countries’ COM 
(2002) 700 fi nal, 9 October 2002. Therein a fourth criterion is not mentioned. However, 
the Copenhagen European Council in addition referred, as an ‘important consideration in 
the general interest of both the Union and the candidate countries’, to the EU’s capacity to 
absorb new members while maintaining the momentum of European integration. A report 
by the Council to the Essen European Council in December 1994, on the development of 
an accession strategy, also refers in this context to ‘respecting [the EU’s] internal cohesion 
and its fundamental principles.’ Cited in M Cremona, ‘EU enlargement: solidarity and con-
ditionality’ (2005) 30 ELR 3, 16.
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conditions of accession to the Union and draw the appropriate conclu-
sions’. Subsequently, they have undergone progressive legalisation, ‘in-
stitutionalisation’14 and even constitutionalisation. Indeed, by the way in 
which they have been prescribed by the highest political authority of the 
European Union and institutionalised by the subsequent pre-accession 
and enhanced pre-accession strategies, they have become quasi-legal15, 
or at least legally enforceable16 requirements. In procedural terms, pri-
mary law provided from the onset for a certain presetting: Article 49 TEU 
(and its predecessor Article 237 EEC).17 In terms of substance, however, 
and notwithstanding the fact that the same core fragments can also be 
traced back through previous enlargements,18 the Copenhagen European 
Council has effectively supplemented Article 49 TEU by, inter alia, declar-
ing that ‘accession will take place as soon as an associated country is 
able to assume the obligations of membership by satisfying the economic 
and political conditions required’. By now, they have acquired a quasi-
constitutional status,19 which is confi rmed by the fact that all subsequent 
applications’ for membership have been made subject to these criteria.20 
Considering the fundamental importance of the Copenhagen condi-
tions, their vagueness and continuously changing substance might at 
fi rst glance be astonishing. Yet, their evolving nature both in terms of 
substance and procedure is in fact functional to their very purpose. As 
pointed out, they are formulated and reformulated in order to secure 
present and future integration achievements. In other words, member-
ship conditionality not only relates to the ability of prospective members 
to cope with the demands of membership, but also concerns the destabil-
ising effect of the presence of new members who do not (yet) share the po-
14  C Hillion, ‘Enlargement of the European Union: A Legal Analysis’ in A Arnull and D Win-
cott (eds), Accountability and Legitimacy in the European Union (OUP, Oxford 2002) 408.
15  Ibid 409.
16  See also below on Accession Partnerships. 
17  In 1978, the Court was asked to give a preliminary ruling on the ‘conditions of admis-
sion and the adjustments to the Treaties’ and considered that Article 237 EEC laid down ‘a 
precise procedure encompassed within well-defi ned limits for the admission of new Member 
States, during which the conditions of accession are to be drawn up by the authorities indi-
cated in the article itself. Thus the legal conditions for such accession remain to be defi ned 
in the context of that procedure without it being possible to determine the content judicially 
in advance.’ Case 93/78 Mattheus v Doego [1978] ECR 2230 paras 7-8.
18  For a detailed account of the history, the meaning and use of the political criteria, see D 
Kochenov, ‘Behind the Copenhagen façade. The meaning and structure of the Copenhagen 
political criterion of democracy and the rule of law’ (2004) 8 European Integration Online 
Papers 10; for a more general appreciation, see also Smith (n 2)109ff. 
19  This has not been changed by the introduction of Article 6 (1) TEU and reference in Ar-
ticle 49 TEU thereto. 
20  The December 1999 Helsinki European Council, for instance, declared that Turkey was 
‘a candidate State destined to join the EU on the basis of the same criteria as applied to the 
other candidate States’. 
279CYELP 3 [2007] 273-306
litical, economic and legal capacity of existing members.21 The conditions’ 
progressive evolution and supplementation can primarily be ascribed to 
the ongoing development of the European Union, but on the other hand 
illustrate a process which is responsive to the specifi city of the aspiring 
member state and other parameters surrounding its application. It has 
however always been inconceivable that the threshold of membership 
should be lowered with the accession of new members, illustrated, inter 
alia, in the notion of an ‘ever closer Union among the peoples of Europe.’ 
An early illustration of this may be found in the Preamble of the 1972 
Accession Treaty, according to which the parties were ‘determined, in 
the spirit of the Treaties, to construct an ever closer union among the 
peoples of Europe on the foundation already laid’. Therefore, by reason 
of their future status as member states, the acceding states have always 
been under an obligation, although not mentioned in Article 49 TEU to 
adopt the entire acquis communautaire.22 This obligation has thus from 
the onset been23 and continues to be one of the key accession principles. 
Conversely, the understanding of the ‘conditions of admission and the 
adjustments to the Treaties’ to be negotiated by the Parties, has indeed 
been fairly restrictive. Only in exceptional cases has ‘adjustment’ been 
envisaged as a re-negotiation of the acquis with the applicant state.24 
Turning to a few examples illustrating this ‘permanent adaptation’ 
then, one needs to begin with the emergence as primus inter pares of 
the fi rst, political, Copenhagen criterion. In the aftermath of the Kosovo 
crisis,25 its fulfi lment has become the pre-requisite for the opening of ac-
cession negotiations. While the European Union’s initial approach was 
an exclusive one, requiring the fulfi lment of all conditions - at least in 
the medium term - in order for accession negotiations to start,26 the De-
cember 1999 Helsinki European Council has moved to a more inclusive 
21  Cf Cremona (n 13) 16.
22  On the meaning, use and evolution of this term, see C Delcourt, ‘The acquis communau-
taire: Has the concept had its day?’ (2001) 38 CML Rev 829.
23  Cf F Hoffmeister, ‘Earlier enlargements’ in A Ott and K Inglis (eds), Handbook on Euro-
pean Enlargement (TMC Asser Press, The Hague 2003) 87, at 97.
24  For examples, see Hillion (n 14) 406.
25  Cf Cremona (n 13) 16. Hillion in this context refers to the changing function of the crite-
ria. Cf C Hillion, ‘The Copenhagen Criteria and their Progeny’ in C Hillion (ed), EU Enlarge-
ment - a Legal Approach (Hart Publishing, Portland 2004).
26  Demonstrated by the 1997 December European Council. This, however, should not be 
considered too categorical as the fulfi lment of the non-political criteria were assessed in a 
more prospective, forward-looking way, and Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia and the 
Czech Republic were considered to satisfy those conditions only in the medium term. The 
multi-layered conditionality that is employed in the framework of the Stabilisation and As-
sociation Process, is reminiscent of the evolution of the Copenhagen political criteria into 
an ‘admissibility’ condition. 
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approach,27 excluding only Turkey explicitly on the basis of the political 
criterion. This however has not meant that an acceding state, ie a can-
didate state having started accession negotiations, has a perfect record 
in all aspects of the political criterion. Recently, this approach has been 
readjusted by the introduction of a new negotiating chapter on ‘Judiciary 
and Fundamental Rights’ (Chapter 23) which allows for these issues to 
be addressed throughout the accession negotiations. Arguably therefore, 
the threshold for the beginning of accession negotiations has been poten-
tially lowered, in contrast to the one for membership. On the other hand, 
it could be possible that the level set for the opening of negotiations has 
remained the same while the standard set for the conclusion of negotia-
tions has been and/or will be raised. The precise way in which this chap-
ter will be used remains to be seen. 
Secondly, the December 1995 Madrid European Council importantly 
qualifi ed the requirement of the ‘ability to take on the obligations of mem-
bership’ by stressing that the applicant countries should ‘adjust their ad-
ministrative structures’. Subsequent European Councils have confi rmed 
and elaborated this, sometimes considered additional,28 institutional re-
quirement. With the conclusion of accession negotiations approaching, 
the parameters of effective and accountable administrative structures as 
well as an impartial and effi cient judiciary, acknowledged to be crucial for 
the effective implementation of the acquis, have progressively29 moved up 
the agenda, eventually becoming a prime priority. While the imperative of 
adequate administrative and judicial structures and its implications will 
be considered below, it is important to emphasise that it did not explicitly 
fi gure among the initial membership conditions. 
Finally, it seems appropriate to address briefl y the issue of ‘absorp-
tion capacity’ in this context. It is recalled that the ‘Union’s ability to 
integrate new members’ has already fi gured among the original 1993 
Copenhagen criteria. Its spectacular emergence at the highest political 
level in autumn 2005 in the context of whether or not to open accession 
negotiations with Turkey (and Croatia) cannot mask its pressure on the 
27  Cf Hillion (n 14) 412. It is the present’s author submission that this is a clear indication 
that enlargement strategy was and continues to be a security strategy aiming at the political 
and economic stabilisation of the entire continent.
28  For instance, P Nicolaides, ‘Preparing for Accession to the European Union: How to 
Establish Capacity for Effective and Credible Application of EU Rules’ in M Cremona, The 
Enlargement of the European Union (OUP, Oxford 2003) 43.
29  This has to be seen in close connection with the growing awareness that the acquis not 
only needed to be adopted but effectively implemented and enforced. The 2001 Commission 
Strategy Paper for instance, upheld by the European Council of December 2001, underlined 
that progress in the negotiations was based on convincing progress in adopting, implement-
ing and enforcing the acquis. The 2002 Seville European Council reiterated in forceful terms 
that ‘the candidate countries must take all necessary measures to bring their administra-
tive and judicial capacity up to the required level.’
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ongoing attempts at institutional reform. Indeed, the likelihood that the 
fourth Copenhagen criterion might be used in future accession negotia-
tions to slow down the pace of negotiations or maybe even to postpone a 
candidate’s accession has already been argued.30 
Having thus recalled the underpinnings and some specifi cities of the 
process of accession to the European Union by revisiting aspects of the 
inherently fl exible and evolving nature of the Copenhagen criteria, recent 
developments in concrete, primarily procedural terms of the concept of 
accession conditionality will be considered by following, as pointed out, a 
‘chronological’ order. 
1. The concept of ‘benchmarking’
‘Benchmarking’ is in essence an evaluation and assessment instru-
ment with the help of detailed, ex-ante, performance indicators. It was 
added to the European Union’s tool box when the European Commission 
decided in 1996 to apply and utilise it as a method to evaluate and com-
pare the effi ciency and performance of the national labour markets of indi-
vidual member states. In the context of the Lisbon Strategy in particular, 
in which the use of an ‘open method of coordination’ for evaluating the 
performance of the Member States based on ‘benchmarking’ has emerged, 
the Commission is committed to reinforcing the regular Scoreboards with 
indicators of the performance of the Member States.31 With the adoption 
of the Wider Europe Policy in March 2003, which developed into the Eu-
ropean Neighbourhood Policy, benchmarking was also incorporated in the 
EU’s foreign policy. In the broadest sense, benchmarking is a system that 
aims at comparing in a systematic manner organisational processes and/
or performances with the objective of improving these processes and thus 
creating new (and higher) standards. Theoretically, all benchmarking mod-
els require ex-ante decisions as regards measurement methods, the units 
to be measured, the appropriate indicators, and detailed and transparent 
timetables that determine the exact time horizon that all actors involved 
need to comply with. The concept of benchmarking aims at identifying con-
crete possibilities for improvement by comparing pre-defi ned indicators. 
Hence, its global objective is to facilitate decisions even if the information 
may sometimes be characterised by uncertainty. Ideally though, the de-
gree of uncertainty is low, not least due to the utilisation of peer reviews 
and monitoring, and in a fi nal stage, a follow-up monitoring of progress.32 
30  Cf Inglis (n 7) 230. 
31  Cf Nicolaides (n 30) 53. 
32  Thanks to Raffaella A Del Sarto, Jean Monnet Fellow, European University Institute, 
for invaluable input on this point. See also R Del Sarto, T Schumacher, E Lannon and A 
Driss, Benchmarking Democratic Development in the Euro-Mediterranean Area: Conceptualis-
ing Ends, Means, and Strategies (EuroMeSCO, 2006) (forthcoming). 
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In the enlargement context, two fairly recent policy developments 
may be considered as de facto precursors to the introduction of ‘bench-
marking’ proper. In the fi rst place, the six rather specifi c legislative acts 
that were mentioned in the December 2004 European Council Conclu-
sions should be mentioned. Their adoption and implementation by Tur-
key was required in order for it to eventually start accession negotiations. 
Secondly, the Roadmaps for Bulgaria and Romania33 provided clear per-
formance indicators (the term ‘benchmark’ was not used) against which 
commitments made in the course of negotiations were intended to be 
monitored. These roadmaps aimed at supporting the two countries’ ef-
forts to meet the remaining criteria for membership by identifying the 
tasks ahead in the form of ‘key steps’, split into short term, medium term, 
and long-term steps, for each of the acquis negotiating chapters. The pa-
rameters included both alignment of legislation and development of ad-
ministrative and judicial capacity. With regard to these ‘predecessors’, it 
readily becomes apparent that in the context of accession conditionality, 
‘benchmarking’ essentially corresponds to an attempt at further ‘detail-
ing’ the process, in terms both of substance and of procedure. 
For the remaining candidates, some of which have started accession 
negotiations, the Commission proposed the adoption of benchmarks, 
presented as a ‘new tool introduced as a result of lessons learnt from the 
fi fth enlargement, to improve the quality of accession negotiations, by 
providing incentives for the candidate countries to undertake necessary 
reforms at an early stage.’34 They are linked to key elements of each ac-
quis chapter and apply throughout such a chapter’s ‘lifecycle’. The proce-
dure is as follows: after a chapter has been screened, the Member States 
decide, upon a Commission recommendation, on whether the chapter 
can be opened for negotiation, or alternatively on the benchmarks to be 
met by the candidate country before its opening. Upon opening nego-
tiations, the Union tables its common position which ideally includes 
benchmarks that have to be met in order to provisionally close the chap-
ter. In terms of substance, opening benchmarks concern ‘key preparatory 
steps for future alignment, and the fulfi lment of contractual obligations 
that mirror acquis requirements’, whereas closing benchmarks ‘primarily 
concern legislative measures, administrative and judicial bodies, and a 
track record of implementation of the acquis.’ Of particular interest is the 
possibility for the Union-side to, upon proposal from the Commission, 
suspend negotiations of a chapter for which the candidate country no 
33  European Commission, ‘Roadmaps for Bulgaria and Romania’ COM (2002) 624 fi nal, 13 
November 2002.
34  European Commission, ‘Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2006-2007, includ-
ing annexed special report on the EU’s capacity to integrate new members’ COM (2006) 649 
fi nal, 8 November 2006, 6. 
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longer fulfi ls the opening benchmarks. Likewise, and following the same 
procedure, a provisionally closed chapter may be re-opened in the case 
of a country no longer fulfi lling the closing benchmarks. By way of ex-
ample, the outcome of screening on chapter 24, ie Justice, Freedom, and 
Security for Croatia can be mentioned. While Croatia was not considered 
suffi ciently prepared for negotiations on this chapter, the Member States 
agreed35 on the adoption of an updated Integrated Border Management 
Action Plan,36 as an opening benchmark. 
It has been argued that the ‘mutation of the accession conditions 
into more tangible legal benchmarks in combination with the increas-
ing institutionalisation of the process, raises the level of expectation of 
‘complying’ applicants.37 This can be fully subscribed to, and a fortiori 
will be the case once the practice of detailed benchmarking has become 
the norm. However, the further submission that the criteria’s embryonic 
constitutional character increasingly commits the Union,38 does not take 
suffi cient account of the existence of the fourth Copenhagen criterion. 
Not only is it true that upon fulfi lment of all ‘objective’ conditions by a 
candidate, the latter does not acquire a right to accede; the existence of 
the ‘absorption capacity condition’ will always add a necessarily subjec-
tive and thus inherently elusive parameter to the process. Furthermore, 
it is submitted that this process, based on a distinction between opening 
and closing benchmarks, leads to a particular classifi cation of the acquis 
communautaire which entails a certain degree of hierarchy. A hierarchy 
that might, and arguably in many instances will, be different from the 
concepts of primary and secondary law sources, or any differentiation 
that is made in terms of importance of certain parts of the acquis over 
others.39 Any possible concerns over this however, are alleviated by a fun-
damental negotiation principle that also applies in an accession context: 
‘Nothing is agreed until everything is agreed’. 
35  Council Secretariat, Document 11667/06 (17 July 2006).
36  Ibid. The Action Plan included ‘concrete actions for both the land border and the blue 
border with targets, realistic deadlines, responsible authorities and an estimated budget for 
each of the actions which require substantial investments. This plan should cover issues 
related to enhancing inter-agency cooperation, legislative alignment and institution-build-
ing and should include increasing the number of border guards, enhancing training efforts 
and improving coordination between the involved services.’
37  Hillion (n 14) 412.
38  Ibid. 
39  Partly on the basis of Opinions 1/91 and 1/92, a distinction has been made, for in-
stance, between a ‘fundamental acquis’ and other types of the acquis, with the former de-
picting ‘the internal constitution of the Community’ and thus fundamental institutional and 
ethical rules; cf Delcourt (n 22) 841-848.
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2. The safeguard mechanisms in the most recent Acts of Accession
Under the title ‘temporary provisions’40 of the most recent Acts of 
Accession, appear - alongside a general economic safeguard clause41 - 
two so-called ‘specifi c safeguard clauses’. They are, when analysed in a 
substantial way, often seen as part of a general discussion of the Act of 
Accession 200342 and or of 200543 but are not generally presented in the 
context of pre-accession conditionality.44 This paper, however, seeks to 
demonstrate that they are essentially conditionality tools, encapsulating 
the spirit and methodology as well as the fundamental function of acces-
sion conditionality, as instrumentalised by the pre-accession strategy. 
The ‘Internal Market’ as well as the ‘Justice and Home Affairs’45 safeguard 
clauses46 represent a form of ‘post-accession’ conditionality,47 refl ecting 
40  Temporary provisions in general, provide for the possibility to restrict the application 
of the acquis or to adopt protective measures, with both being subject to procedural and 
substantive conditions.
41  Article 37 and Article 36 of the 2003 Act of Accession and 2005 Act of Accession, respec-
tively. The clause is not a novelty and has, albeit with a shorter period of application (one 
year instead of three), already been included in the Act of Accession for Austria, Finland 
and Sweden (Article 152). 
42  Cf C Hillion, ‘The European Union is dead. Long live the European Union. A commentary 
on the Treaty of Accession 2003’ (2004) 29 ELR 583; K Inglis, ‘The Union’s fi fth Accession 
Treaty: New means to make enlargement possible’ (2004) 41 CML Rev 937; E Lannon, ‘Le 
Traité d’adhésion d’Athènes’ (2003) 17 Cahiers du droit européen; with the exception of 
Leardini and Isak, who exclusively focus on the Internal Market safeguard clause: P Lear-
dini, ‘Une nouveauté dans l’Acte d’adhésion des dix nouveaux Etats membres de l’Union 
européenne: la clause de sauvegarde ‘Marché intérieur’ (2004) Revue du Droit de l’Union 
Européenne 53; H Isak, ‘Binnenmarkt und EU-Erweiterung’ in M Karollus, H Köck and 
S Stadlmeier, Gegenwärtiger Stand und zukünftige Entwicklungen des EU-Binnenmarktes 
(Trauner Verlag, Linz 2006) 43.
43  Cf A Lazowski, ‘And then they were twenty-seven… A legal appraisal of the sixth acces-
sion treaty’ (2007) 44 CML Rev 401.
44  For a notable exception, see Cremona (n 13) and, to a certain extent, Inglis (n 42). 
45  It is submitted that the notion ‘Justice and Home Affairs’ in the present contribution is 
used interchangeably with ‘The Area of Freedom, Security and Justice’.
46  The provisions in the 2005 Act of Accession in essence duplicate their predecessors. Ar-
ticle 37 of the 2005 Act of Accession corresponds to Article 38 of the 2003 Act of Accession. 
Conversely, Article 38 of the former duplicates Article 39 of the latter. The provisions of the 
2005 Act of Accession deviate only by way of integrating the language of the Constitutional 
Treaty. After proposal by the European Commission in September 2002, the respective 
Council Working Group considered the provisions, before the texts were adopted by the 
Council in October 2002 tel quel, with the only changes made in terms of prolonging the 
invocation period from two to three years. Cf Leardini (n 42) 58. 
47  In the affi rmative, even though she does not use the expression ‘post-accession’ condi-
tionality, see Inglis (n 42). According to this author’s view, the ‘current’ enlargement presents 
enormous challenges to the function of the Union, which demands a high degree of mutual 
trust between Member States and explains the introduction of the new safeguard measures. 
Leardini (n 42) considers the extremely diverse socio-economic and judicial situations in the 
acceding states and above all the very limited number of transitional arrangements, as the 
main reasons for introducing the Internal Market safeguard clause. 
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the need to ensure that the new member states keep up their momentum 
in approximation to and compliance with the internal market and JHA 
acquis.48 Two arguments, closely related, support this argumentation. 
First, the wording of the safeguard clauses implicitly refl ects their 
conditionality nature. This applies in particular to the expression ‘com-
mitments undertaken in the context of the accession negotiations’, used 
in the Internal Market safeguard clauses.49 Some commentators50 have 
criticized the elusiveness of this term, whereas it is submitted here that 
this expression perfectly encapsulates the intended function of this type 
of post-accession conditionality. The term had been chosen precisely in 
order to ensure the European Union’s, or indeed the Commission’s fi rm 
grip over ongoing reforms in the acceding and new Member States. It 
deliberately goes beyond the suggestion of a unilateral declaration by six 
new Member States, namely that it ‘only covers the obligations that are 
arising from the original Treaties applicable to (the respective new Mem-
ber States), under the conditions laid down in the Act of Accession, and 
the obligations defi ned in this Act.’51 It is argued that, fi rst, the expres-
sion ‘commitments undertaken in the context of the accession negotia-
tions’ relates to the ‘pace of accession negotiations’52 and that, second, it 
is mostly by reason of the continuous lack of full and adequate adminis-
trative and judicial capacity that such a wording was chosen.53 Although 
there is no acquis as to what may be considered ‘adequate administrative 
structures’ or ‘effi cient judiciary’, the pre-accession instruments allowed 
48  Cf Inglis (n 42) 953.
49  Articles 38 and 37 of the 2003 and 2005 Acts of Accession, respectively.
50  Cremona for instance asks what other commitments might be intended than Com-
munity law obligations in the ordinary sense; cf Cremona (n 13) 20. Hillion on the other 
hand claims that all essential commitments undertaken during the accession negotiations 
should have been included in the Treaty and thus wonders why reference is not directly 
made to the Treaty of Accession itself; cf Hillion (n 42) 603. Leardini fi nally calls for a prag-
matic approach to interpret this expression and lists a number of possible examples, such 
as going-beyond production quota, non-elimination of state aids contrary to Community 
law, insuffi cient supervision of fi nancial services, or the preservation of an inadequate level 
of education in the health care sector that would justify suspension of the free movement 
provisions; cf Leardini (n 42) 53.
51  Declaration No 22, ‘Joint Declaration by the Czech Republic, the Republic of Estonia, 
the Republic of Lithuania, the Republic of Poland, the Republic of Slovenia and the Slovak 
Republic on Article 38 of the Act of Accession’ [2003] OJ L236/33, 978.
52  Hillion (n 42) 603. This author merely considers this as a possibility. He further points 
to the fact that the provisional closure of the chapters was made conditional on the Union 
confi dence in the credibility of the ‘commitments made by the candidates’. 
53  In its 2003 Comprehensive Monitoring Report, for instance, the Commission warned 
using the safeguard clauses to address failures in the administrative capacity of several 
acceding states, to apply the rules on mutual recognition of professional qualifi cations or 
social security provisions. Cf European Commission, ‘Comprehensive Monitoring Report of 
the European Commission on the state of preparedness for EU membership’ COM (2003) 
675 fi nal, 5 November 2003.
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for guidance and monitoring the required and enormous reform efforts of 
the candidate states with respect to their public service sectors and the 
judiciary, and ultimately the effective implementation and enforcement 
of the acquis. The only possibility for ensuring continuity in this respect 
was to use a wording in the ‘specifi c safeguard clauses’ that would pro-
vide an explicit legal basis to tackle failures in meeting pre-accession 
commitments in the crucial domain of administrative and judicial ca-
pacity. Indeed, it was in this context that the Internal Market safeguard 
clause was invoked by the Commission shortly before the accession of 
Bulgaria - at the time of writing the only instance of its use. Due to seri-
ous shortcomings in aviation safety, the Commission adopted safeguard 
measures in the form of a Commission regulation on the basis of Articles 
4(3) and 37 of the 2005 Act of Accession.54 Under its provisions, airwor-
thiness and maintenance certifi cates issued by the Bulgarian authori-
ties are not recognized in the EU (Article 1). Moreover, air carriers with 
Bulgarian licences are not granted unlimited access to the EU aviation 
market, as they do not qualify as ‘Community air carriers’. These are 
considered appropriate measures by the Commission, resulting from the 
lack of administrative capacity of the Bulgarian Civil Aviation Authorities 
to fulfi l the required safety oversight duties. 
Second, the safeguard clauses are, just as conditionality instruments 
in general, of an essentially protective nature, envisaging the mainte-
nance of the achieved level of European integration. The provisions in 
the Acts of Accession should be considered as a direct continuation of 
pre-accession monitoring. As a result of the Commission’s often articu-
lated intention to continuously monitor the implementation of the com-
mitments and obligations taken on by the acceding (sic) states, the safe-
guard clauses were worded so as to allow for their invocation also before 
accession, in the case of which the adopted measures would enter into 
force as of the date of accession. The reach of pre-accession efforts into 
the post-accession phase in domains considered to be crucial is also il-
lustrated by the introduction of a ‘special transition facility for institution 
building’,55 in order to further support administrative and judicial capac-
ity building. Furthermore, the Commission, as ‘guardian of the Treaties’, 
perceives and presents these provisions as ‘precautionary measures’ 
which supplement existing safeguard mechanisms,56 peer pressure, an-
54  Commission Regulation (EC) 1962/2006 of 21 December 2006 on application of Art 37 
of the Act of Accession of Bulgaria to the European Union [2006] OJ L408/8.
55  European Commission, ‘Towards the Enlarged Union: Strategy Paper and Report of the 
European Commission on the progress towards accession by each of the candidate coun-
tries’ COM (2002) 700 fi nal, 9 October 2002, 27.
56  The Internal Market Safeguard clauses themselves give precedence to existing sectoral 
safeguard mechanisms, such as Article 30 ECT or specifi c safeguard clauses that may have 
been introduced into secondary legislation by virtue of Art 95 ECT. The latter, for instance, 
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nual reporting on implementation of Community law57 or infringement 
proceedings.58 Arguably therefore, these provisions do not directly relate 
to the enforcement of the aquis, in the sense of compelling compliance 
with an obligation59, but merely aim at avoiding all risks of non-applica-
tion of the acquis by the new Member States, and thus reassuring the 
old Member States,60 should a situation arise, ‘which may have serious 
non-economic consequences such as for the protection of health or life of 
humans, animals or plants, protection of intellectual property or general 
reasons of public policy as defi ned in Article 30 ECT,’61 areas also high-
lighted in the comprehensive Monitoring Reports.
3. The cooperation and verifi cation mechanism
The third development of the European Union’s accession condition-
ality, is the so-called ‘cooperation and verifi cation mechanism’ that as 
much as the two provisions just discussed is a form of post-accession 
conditionality. In its Monitoring Report on the state of preparedness for 
EU membership of Bulgaria and Romania from September 2006,62 the 
European Commission confi rmed these countries’ ‘capacity to apply EU 
principles and legislation from 1 January 2007.’ In the very same report 
however, it was obliged to highlight a number of domains where imme-
diate action or further efforts were required: for Bulgaria, inter alia, the 
justice system (transparency and effi ciency of judicial processes; adop-
tion of the procedural code and the judicial system act), the fi ght against 
corruption, police cooperation and the fi ght against organised crime, and 
the integrated administrative control system for agriculture (TACS); for 
Romania, the justice system (consistent interpretation and application of 
the law in all courts), the fi ght against corruption, paying agencies and 
provide for emergency measures to be taken by the Commission or a Member States where 
a serious risk is posed to human health, animal health or the environment. By way of ex-
ample, Articles 53 and 54 of Regulation 178/2002 laying down the general principles and 
requirements of food law, establishing the European Food Safety Authority and laying down 
procedures in matters of food safety (OJ L31/1) may be mentioned. 
57  The comprehensive Monitoring Reports, for instance, are presented as a precursor of the 
Annual Report on the Monitoring of the Application of Community law, issued regularly by 
the Commission for all Member States. Cf European Commission (n 55) 25.
58  Commissioner Verheugen, in a speech in November 2002 before the Assemblée nation-
ale française, stated that the safeguard provisions would ‘certainly not [be used] against 
infringements of the Treaties.’ Translated from Lannon (n 42).
59  Cf S Andersen, ‘The Functional Overlap of Enforcement and Implementation Tools’ in 
this issue. 
60  Cf Lannon (n 42) 65.
61  European Commission (n 55) 25. 
62  Cf European Commission, ‘Monitoring Report on the state of preparedness for EU mem-
bership of Bulgaria and Romania’ COM (2006) 549 fi nal, 26 September 2006
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interconnectivity of tax systems. Clearly, the justice system and various 
levels of public administration, as well as the fi ght against corruption 
constitute the core of the concerns identifi ed by the Commission. Bearing 
thus in mind the shortcomings in fulfi lling accession commitments in this 
area, the Commission has decided to introduce a ‘scrutiny mechanism 
adding a preliminary phase’63 to the one-stage procedure for invoking the 
safeguard clauses, without however precluding an immediate application 
of the latter, should it prove necessary.64
By way of Commission decisions for Bulgaria and Romania respec-
tively, that entered into force on these countries’ date of accession, the 
Commission indorses the specifi c benchmarks already established in its 
September 2006 Monitoring Report as it considers that ‘the remaining 
issues in the accountability and effi ciency of the judicial system and law 
enforcement bodies warrant the establishment of a mechanism for coop-
eration and verifi cation of the progress of Bulgaria/Romania to address 
specifi c benchmarks in the areas of judicial reform and the fi ght against 
corruption (and organised crime in the case of Bulgaria).65 The mechanism 
thus applies to selected types of accession commitments only. Based on 
Articles 37 and 38 of the 2005 Act of Accession, but also the EC Treaty 
and the Treaty establishing the European Union, as well as the Treaty 
of Accession and Article 4 (3) thereof,66 the decisions also provide for the 
possibility to amend the benchmarks listed in the annexes, as well as 
for their repeal when all the benchmarks have been fulfi lled. Under their 
provisions, the newly acceding countries shall, by 31 March of each year, 
and for the fi rst time by 31 March 2007, report to the Commission on the 
progress made in addressing each of the benchmarks provided for (Article 
1). The decisions also foresee the communication of the Commission’s 
comments on the respective reports to the European Parliament and the 
Council (Article 2).
The benchmarks identifi ed, set forth in the annexes of the respective 
decisions, are indispensable pre-requisites for the functioning of the pre-
dominant integration instrument in the two areas targeted by the safe-
63  Lazowski (n 43) 418.
64  See recitals 8 of both Decisions: Commission Decision (2006/929/EC) establishing 
a mechanism for cooperation and verifi cation of progress in Bulgaria to address specifi c 
benchmarks in the areas of judicial reform and the fi ght against corruption and organised 
crime [2006] OJ L354/58 ; Commission Decision (2006/928/EC) establishing a mechanism 
for cooperation and verifi cation of progress in Romania to address specifi c benchmarks in 
the areas of judicial reform and the fi ght against corruption [2006] OJ L354/57.
65  Ibid, recital 6 of the respective Commission Decisions.
66  This provision provides that the institutions of the Union may before accession adopt 
the measures referred to in, inter alia, Articles 37, 38 and 39 of the Protocol concerning the 
conditions and arrangements for admission of the Republic of Bulgaria and Romania to the 
European Union. 
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guard clauses, namely the principle of mutual recognition. Indeed, before 
listing the respective benchmarks, the Commission recalls the effects of 
Articles 37 and 38 of the Act of Accession, which include the suspension 
of [current] Member States’ obligation to recognise and execute, under 
the conditions laid down in Community law, Bulgarian/Romanian judg-
ments and judicial [and prosecutors’] decisions, such as European arrest 
warrants,’67 ‘falling under the principle of mutual recognition.’68 For both 
Bulgaria69 and Romania70, the overriding themes of the benchmarks are 
independence, accountability, transparency and effi ciency of the judicial 
system, connected to and with further insistence on the fi ght against cor-
ruption. Failure to address the benchmarks may result in recourse to the 
safeguard clause. Arguably, the Commission intended to reinforce the 
safeguard clauses for these crucial issues by adding a somewhat low-key 
way of exercising its surveillance over reforms regarding administrative 
and judicial structures.
67  Recital 7 of the respective Commission Decisions (n 64).
68  European Commission (n 62) 10. 
69  Benchmarks to be addressed by Bulgaria are:
1. Adopt constitutional amendments removing any ambiguity regarding the independence 
and accountability of the judicial system.
2. Ensure a more transparent and effi cient judicial process by adopting and implementing a 
new judicial system act and the new civil procedure code. Report on the impact of these new 
laws and of the penal and administrative procedure codes, notably on the pre-trial phase.
3. Continue the reform of the judiciary in order to enhance professionalism, accountability 
and effi ciency. Evaluate the impact of this reform and publish the results annually.
4. Conduct and report on professional, non-partisan investigations into allegations of high-
level corruption. Report on internal inspections of public institutions and on the publication 
of assets of high-level offi cials.
5. Take further measures to prevent and fi ght corruption, in particular at the borders and 
within local government. 
6. Implement a strategy to fi ght organised crime, focussing on serious crime, money laun-
dering as well as on the systematic confi scation of assets of criminals. Report on new and 
ongoing investigations, indictments and convictions in these areas.
70  Benchmarks to be addressed by Romania are:
1. Ensure a more transparent, and effi cient judicial process notably by enhancing the ca-
pacity and accountability of the Superior Council of Magistracy. Report and monitor the 
impact of the new civil and penal procedures codes.
2. Establish, as foreseen, an integrity agency with responsibilities for verifying assets, in-
compatibilities and potential confl icts of interest, and for issuing mandatory decisions on 
the basis of which dissuasive sanctions can be taken.
3. Building on progress already made, continue to conduct professional, non-partisan in-
vestigations into allegations of high-level corruption.
4. Take further measures to prevent and fi ght against corruption, in particular within the 
local government.
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III. Benchmarking, post-accession conditionality and their impact 
on compliance mechanisms 
Post-accession conditionality mechanisms and their underlying ra-
tionale of protecting the achieved level of integration, leading on from 
the instruments of prescribing, monitoring, assessing and guiding in the 
pre-accession context, invite a more general refl ection on EU compliance 
mechanisms. Maintaining the momentum of European integration, ulti-
mately rests upon compliance with the acquis, understood as encompass-
ing adoption, implementation and effective enforcement, enabled by the 
Member States’ adequate administrative and judicial structures. Indeed, 
implementation and enforcement issues have steadily drifted up the EU 
political agenda, and one reason for this arguably lies in enlargement,71 
generating an intrinsic link between the growing emphasis on effective 
implementation and enforcement, as well as the imperative of adequate 
administrative and judicial structures, and the diffi culties in general of 
ensuring compliance with EU law. In this context, it can be argued that 
enlargement provided an opportunity, as well as the experiences in car-
rying out the pre-accession strategies and expertise, 
to experiment with new methods for securing compliance that com-
plement the EU’s existing sanctions-based mechanisms in a way 
that is more refl ective of this notion of voluntary cooperation. The 
introduction of such methods in the relationship between the EU 
and the present Member States may serve to enhance patterns of 
compliance in those states as well.72
The following refl ections on compliance with the acquis communau-
taire, understood in the broad sense usual in the enlargement context,73 in 
a post-accession period, will follow a two-fold approach which refl ects the 
following distinction with respect to the Commission’s steadily increasing 
powers: direct expansion of the Commission’s powers due to the proc-
esses and procedures of the pre- and post-accession conditionality strate-
gies, inferable from the wording of the safeguard mechanisms in particu-
lar; and indirect expansion by way of what the wording of the provisions 
leaves out.74 Before doing so, a few preliminary remarks are required.
71  Cf C Harlow and R Rawlings, ‘Accountability and law enforcement: the centralised EU 
infringement procedure’ (2006) 31 ELR 447, 452.
72  R Bieber and M Vaerini, ‘Implementation and Compliance: Stimulus for New Governance 
Structures in the Accession Countries’ in Bermann and Pistor, Law and Governance in an 
enlarged European Union (Hart Publishing, Oregon 2006) 389. 
73  Cf Delcourt (n 22) 832.
74  However, the distinction thus made between direct and indirect empowerment of the 
Commission is not a clear-cut one nor does it neatly correspond to other distinctions made 
with respect to compliance enforcement mechanisms, such as the one advocated by Munoz 
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The fi rst point to be mentioned, although strictly speaking limited to 
the Community legal order, is the principle that ultimately it is the role 
of the institutions, in particular the Commission and the Court of Jus-
tice, to ensure that the law is observed. There is no room, therefore, for 
any form of ‘self-help’ compliance enforcement by one Member State in 
respect of another: direct State-to-State retaliation or counter-measures 
by another Member State, are not permitted.75 Member States have also 
good cause to delegate the responsibility of law enforcement to the Com-
mission. Interpolation of the Commission between Member States serves 
to defl ect their wrath and defuse inter-state battles at the political level.76 
At the basis of all compliance procedures lies thus the principle of loyal 
cooperation enshrined in Article 10 ECT that applies to European institu-
tions77 and national authorities alike.
In general however, and this is the second point, the Member States 
are left to decide for themselves how to implement and bring their law in 
line with Community law.78 In a similar vein, they enjoy autonomy to en-
sure enforcement of the acquis. The Court of Justice, by invoking Article 
10 ECT, has consistently held that in the absence of Community rules 
governing a matter, it is for the domestic legal systems of each Mem-
ber State to designate the courts and tribunals as well as to establish 
the procedural rules ensuring the protection of individual Community 
(R Munoz, ‘The monitoring of the application of Community law: a need to improve the cur-
rent tools and an obligation to innovate’ (2006) Jean Monnet Working Paper 04) between 
ex-ante mechanisms (eg under the Notifi cation Directive), ex-post mechanisms (eg the cen-
tralised infringement procedure) and hybrid forms (eg SOLVIT) or the distinction advanced 
by Bieber (Bieber and Vaerini (n 72) 389) between coercive means (denoting those require-
ments of EC legislation which restrict the Member States’ autonomy in implementing EC 
law, and whose respect is ensured by the infringement procedure) and soft means (encom-
passing all EC law measures designed to encourage or facilitate national implementation 
of EU law and policy, or to guide Member States effectively through the implementation 
process).
75  The Court of Justice has even held that a failure on the part of one Member State to 
implement Community regulatory procedures does not justify other Member States in the 
imposition of health or welfare-based trade restrictions: A Member State may not unilater-
ally adopt, on its own authority, corrective or protective measures designed to obviate any 
breach by another Member State of rules of Community law. Case C-5/94 R. v MAFF Ex p. 
Hedley Lomas [1996] ECR I-2553 para 20, citing Joined Cases 90/63 and 91/63 Commis-
sion v Luxembourg and Belgium [1964] ECR 625 and Case 232/78 Commission v France 
[1979] ECR 2729 para 9. It is however possible of course, although rare, for one Member 
State to bring an action against another for breach of a Community law obligation, by virtue 
of Art 227 EC.
76  Cf Harlow and Rawlings (n 71) 452.
77  See, for instance, Case C-65/93 European Parliament v Council [1995] ECR I-643 para 
23.
78  Retaliatory or safeguard measures, or other trade defence mechanisms such as anti-
dumping or countervailing duties are not a normal part of the Community legal order.
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rights.79 For that matter however, the Court also established limits to na-
tional autonomy, referred to as the principle of full effectiveness and the 
principle of non-discrimination or equivalence.80
Finally, the distinction between implementation or transposition 
through domestic legislation and effective enforcement by national ad-
ministrative and judicial authorities is to be emphasised. Overseeing the 
latter, is ‘most problematic for the Commission, which does not have at 
its disposal recourse to national courts. Nor does the Commission have 
at its disposal a general inspectorate, nor indeed any general inspectorial 
function.’81 Failure to enforce transposed acquis is diffi cult for the Com-
mission to identify, so that it has to rely on private informants, and it is 
harder to prove. It almost goes without saying then, that the lack of these 
tools, in the light of the principle of ‘indirect administration’ of the Com-
mission, has important repercussions on the Commission’s general role 
as ‘guardian of the Treaties’. 
1. Ensuring compliance in the accession context
What precisely are then the powers of the Commission in ensuring 
compliance in the accession context? Do they deviate from its powers in 
a strictly internal context, and do they even go beyond its constitutional 
role as ‘guardian of the Treaties’? One may begin with and briefl y present 
the Commission’s role in the pre-accession and negotiation phase. In-
deed, the Commission’s role in determining the precise content of the 
accession conditions, primarily the Copenhagen criteria, has been and 
continues to be determinative. In procedural terms, the Agenda 2000 
methodology of regular monitoring and progress assessment essentially 
contributed towards enabling the Union to make the criteria not just a 
‘wish-list’ or a statement of expectations, but a workable tool in governing 
the accession.82 By virtue of this methodology, 83 the Commission exer-
79  See, for instance, Case 33/76 Rewe-Zentralfi nanz eG and Rewe-Zentral AG v Landwirt-
schaftskammer für das Saarland [1976] ECR 1989 and Case 158/80 Rewe-Handelsgesells-
chaft Nord mbH v Hauptzollamt Kiel [1981] ECR 1805, cited in P Craig and G de Burca, EU 
Law - Text, Cases, and Materials (3rd Edition OUP, Oxford 003) 231ff.
80  C-431/93 Van Schijndel [1995] ECR I-4705 para 17; Case C-177/88 Dekker v Stichting 
voor Jong Volwassenen Plus [1990] ECR I-3941; for further references, see Craig and de 
Burca (n 79) 234ff.
81  C Harlow, Accountability in the European Union (OUP, Oxford 2002) 72. See also Harlow 
and Rawlings (n 71) 453. Although it can, in some instances, be empowered to appoint so-
called ‘authorised agents’ to carry out controls and inspections of the Communities’ own 
resources. Council Regulation 1026/1999/EC, cited in Bieber and Vaerini (n 72) 389.
82  Cf Kochenov (n 18) 6.
83  Cf Inglis (n 7) 248. Inglis makes a general point and refers to it as a ‘direct consequence 
of the Union’s eagerness to diffuse the potential political fall out of such a rigorous and 
demanding conditionality’ and considers ‘the fi rm grip of the European Commission on the 
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cised the complete assessment of compliance with the established condi-
tions through regular reports on progress towards accession84, accompa-
nied by analytical papers.85 Eventually, today, the Commission manages 
the entire process of accession. Two instruments in particular deserve 
special mention, that is the Accession Partnerships (equivalent to the 
European Partnerships for the countries of the Stabilisation and Acces-
sion Process) and the so-called Action Plans. The Accession Partnerships, 
endorsed by the 1997 Luxembourg European Council as a ‘new instru-
ment and a key-feature of the enhanced pre-accession strategy’, as well 
as the comparable European Partnerships,86 made the Copenhagen crite-
ria legally enforceable,87 since the reception by the candidates of fi nancial 
aid from the Union was made dependent on their performance related 
to meeting the Copenhagen criteria.88 The individual partnerships, tai-
lor-made and supposedly directed specifi cally towards each candidate’s 
needs in its preparation for membership, are essentially an oeuvre of the 
Commission, drawn up, regularly adapted and monitored by its services. 
The power to sanction the candidate country on the basis of the partner-
ship - via a reduction or suspension of pre-accession funds geared to help 
its accession - while it is negotiating with the Member States, renders 
accession negotiations ever more illusionary. This ‘mis sous tutelle’89 was 
administration of the instruments of pre-accession’ as a means that take ‘the heat out of 
the implementation and progress of the pre-accession strategy’ and ‘bringing structure to 
the accession negotiations’.
84  From 1998 to 2003, then only on Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey. The 2003 Comprehen-
sive Monitoring Reports on Preparations for Membership by Each of the ten new Member 
States, released on 5 November 2003, were summarised in a 2003 Comprehensive Moni-
toring Report and were structurally different from the Regular Reports as they were based 
acquis chapters. European Commission, ‘2003 Comprehensive Monitoring Report of the 
European Commission on the State of Preparedness for EU Membership of the Czech Re-
public, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia’ 
COM(2003) 675 fi nal, 5 November 2003
85  Entitled Composite Papers in 1998 and 1999 and Strategy Papers from then on. 
86  These were set up with Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the former Yugoslav Republic 
of Macedonia, and Serbia and Montenegro including Kosovo and represent a framework of 
priority action and a fi nancial structure. It is to be noted that not all of these countries had 
or have contractual bilateral relations at the moment of their adoption. Council Regulation 
(EC) 533/2004 of 22 March 2004 on the establishment of European partnerships in the 
framework of the stabilisation and association process [2004] OJ L86.
87  Cf K Inglis, ‘The Europe Agreements compared in the light of their pre-accession reori-
entation’ (2000) 37 CML Rev; for a detailed analysis of the Accession Partnerships, see H 
Grabbe, ‘A Partnership for Accession? The Implications of EU Conditionality for the Central 
and East European Applicants’, Working Paper No 99/12 (EUI Robert Schumann Centre 
for Advanced Studies, 1999).
88  By virtue of Article 4 of Council Regulation (EC) 622/98 on assistance to the applicant 
States in the framework of the pre-accession strategy, and in particular on the establish-
ment of Accession Partnerships, [1998] OJ L85.
89  Hillion (n 14) 418.
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consolidated by the Action Plans.90 Thereby, the candidates were in par-
ticular asked to prepare their administrative and judicial structures for 
accession under close scrutiny of the Commission. In this context, and 
while the very nature of enlargement necessitates an integrated, cross-pil-
lar approach, requiring the candidate and acceding states not only to align 
with Community law in a narrow sense, but with the accession acquis in 
a broad sense including all measures and principles adopted under the 
second and third pillar, the role of the Commission with respect to condi-
tionality in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice deserves particular 
attention. Also in this policy area, it promotes and controls the progressive 
alignment of the acquis by the future Member States, thereby acting well 
beyond its traditional role as guardian of the (Community) Treaties vis-à-
vis the Member States.91 On the other hand, giving such responsibilities 
to the Commission takes the political heat out of managing and checking 
compliance with what is a highly political area of the acquis. 
Worth mentioning also, as they mitigate the impression of the purely 
technocratic nature of the Commission’s role - which admittedly is also 
the argument for the Commission’s central role in the entire process - are 
the so-called early warning letters. For the fi rst time, in the context of 
the accession of the ‘10 new Member States’, these ‘early warning letters 
at a political level’ had been sent to certain candidate states, aimed at 
putting additional reformatory pressure on candidates in sensitive areas. 
Interestingly, these were offi cially signed by the Director General of the 
Directorate-General for Enlargement at that time, Eneko Landaburu, ad-
dressed to the heads of state or government.92
Under this comprehensive system, the evolution of the relation-
ship with each candidate, even if ultimately under the political control 
of the (European) Council was essentially determined on an evaluation 
and assessment under the sole responsibility of the European Commis-
sion. The same is true as to the pace of accession negotiations. Indeed, 
the pivotal role of the Commission throughout the accession negotiations 
has already been noted93 - one might even argue that the Commission is 
de facto negotiating the content and limits to the transitional arrange-
ments. This central role has yet again been reinforced by the system 
90  Ibid.
91  For details, see R Byrne, G Noll and J Vedsted, New Asylum Countries? Migration Control 
and Refugee Protection in an Enlarged European Union (Kluwer, 2002); mentioned also in 
M Cremona and C Hillion, ‘L’Union fait la force? Potential and Limitations of the European 
Neighbourhood Policy as an Integrated EU Foreign and Security Policy’ (2006) EUI Working 
Papers 39.
92  There was, for instance, a letter sent to the Polish prime minister on the issue of admin-
istrative capacity with respect to the administration of agricultural and regional funds. 
93  Cf Inglis (n 42) 954. 
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of ‘benchmarking’ for the opening and closure of accession negotiation 
acquis chapters. 
Turning to the provisions of the Acts of Accession themselves, one 
might fi rst mention the Commission’s considerable discretion in the in-
terpretation of the general economic safeguard clauses as evidenced by 
the Court of Justice.94 To a similar extent, the wording of the specifi c safe-
guard mechanisms in the 2003 and 2005 Acts of Accession has given a 
‘considerable’95 discretion to the Commission at all stages of its invocation. 
The Commission, by ‘taking appropriate measures’, evaluates whether the 
commitments have been met or not; it is also the Commission that decides 
on the necessity of a transitional suspension of the acquis or any other 
type of action96 and - upon their adoption - on their intensity and duration. 
And again, it is the Commission that may adapt them in the course of time 
and evaluates whether and when the failed commitments have been rem-
edied to the extent necessary in order to lift the safeguard measures. 
Arguably, the conditions of substance imposed on the Commission 
by these provisions are for the most part merely a codifi cation of princi-
ples guiding internal market law and policy in general, or in fact of com-
mon sense and proportionality. The Internal Market safeguards clauses 
provide that ‘measures shall be proportional and priority shall be given 
to measures, which least disturb the functioning of the internal market 
and, where appropriate, to the application of the existing sectoral safe-
guard mechanisms’ as well as that they ‘shall not be invoked as a means 
of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade between 
Member States’. The clauses relating to the Area of Freedom, Security 
and Justice foresee that ‘these measures may take the form of temporary 
suspension of the application of relevant provisions and decisions in the 
relations between a new Member State and any other Member State or 
Member States, without prejudice to the continuation of close judicial 
cooperation’ and that they ‘shall be maintained no longer than strictly 
necessary, and, in any case, will be lifted when the shortcomings are 
remedied.’ Ultimately, the Commission’s margin of discretion in authoris-
ing and determining the appropriate measures depends on the European 
Court of Justice’s appreciation of the level of control required or justi-
fi ed.97 Presumably the margin of discretion would be considered as wide 
94  Case 11/82 SA Piraiki-Patraiki and others v Commission [1985] ECR 207. Case 258/81 
Metallurgiki Halyps v Commission [1982] ECR 4261; Case 289/83 GAARM v Commission 
[1984] ECR 4295; Case 114/83 Société d’Initiatives et de Coopération Agricole and Société 
Interprofessionnelle des Producteurs et Expéditeurs de Fruits, Légumes, Bulbes et Fleurs d’Il-
le-et-Vilaine v Commission [1984] ECR 2589. Cited in Inglis (n 42) 952.
95  Inglis (n 42) 955. 
96  Ibid, ‘unspecifi ed’.
97  Hillion argues that the European Court of Justice may review the proportionality of the 
measures adopted by virtue of Article 230 ECT. Cf Hillion (n 42) 602.
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as it is for the general economic safeguard clause. Thus, the applicant 
under Article 230 ECT will have to show that the measure is ‘manifestly 
inappropriate having regard to the objective which the competent author-
ity wishes to pursue’.98 The diffi culty of such an undertaking and the po-
litical courage required on the part of the new Member State concerned,99 
is however beyond doubt. 
In relation to the Commission’s margin of discretion in taking ap-
propriate measures in general, it has been argued100 that the expres-
sion ‘may’ suggests one which resembles the discretion the Commission 
enjoys in relation to infringement proceedings. There, the Commission 
cannot be sued for having failed to take action, or for refusing to take 
action.101 While in itself arguably not threatening the inter-institutional 
balance, this discretion does put the Commission in an ‘unusual’102 and 
indeed awkward position, as it has been given more teeth to ensure the 
proper functioning of the internal market vis-à-vis certain Member States 
than with regard to others. 
On the other hand, if one considers that post-accession condition-
ality is the very raison d’être of the specifi c safeguard clauses, then this 
‘highly asymmetrical arrangement’103 which distinguishes between the 
remedies available to the old Member States and those available to the 
new Member States, is not only justifi ed but also perfectly fi ts in with the 
Commission’s pivotal role throughout the accession process. The diffi cul-
ties for the Commission in relation to the burden of proof that a fortiori, 
as presented above, arise in case of a failure of domestic enforcement, 
have certainly been a determinative factor for establishing in addition to 
the ‘tools applicable to all Member States’, and ‘tools based on the Ac-
cession Treaty’, the cooperation and verifi cation mechanisms. They un-
doubtedly provides a much more incremental and targeted mechanism 
to exercise pressure on the judicial systems and the ongoing reforms 
thereof, on which the Commission’s role as ‘guardian of the Treaties’ inter 
alia depends. Furthermore, bearing in mind the ‘almost unconstitutional’ 
role of the Commission with respect to the Union acquis under Title VI - 
the related screening of national legislation, its prioritisation and the sur-
veillance of its implementation - it does not come as a surprise that this 
role has been transmitted into the post-accession phase. The absence of 
temporary derogations, except in relation to the Schengen acquis, led the 
98  For instance, Case 11/82 Piraiki-Patraiki [1985] ECR 207 and Case C-331/88 Fedesa 
[1990] ECR I-4023. 
99  The two specifi c safeguard clauses can only be invoked against a new Member State. 
100  Cf Hillion (n 42) 604. 
101  Case 7/68 Commission v Italy [1986] ECR 423; Case 24/87 Starfruit [1989] ECR 291.
102  Hillion (n 42) 604.
103  Ibid.
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Commission and the Member States to envisage ‘sui generis’104 provisions 
to address not only the ‘serious shortcomings or any imminent risks of 
such shortcomings in the transposition, state of implementation, or the 
application of directives and Regulations relating to mutual recognition 
in civil matters under Title IV of the EC Treaty’. These provisions indeed 
introduced a fall-back provision that endowed the Commission with the 
power to suspend the judicial co-operation as a result of alleged ‘serious 
shortcomings or any imminent risks of such shortcomings in the trans-
position, state of implementation, or the application of the framework 
decisions or any other relevant commitments, instruments of coopera-
tion and decisions relating to mutual recognition in the area of criminal 
law under Title VI of the EU Treaty.’105 The Acts of Accession thus equally 
granted the Commission considerable power with respect to secondary 
measures adopted under the third pillar, whereas it does not have an 
equivalent power under the EU Treaty itself. Indeed, by way of these 
provisions, the Commission’s pivotal role in formulating, monitoring and 
assessing progress in reforming and adapting the judicial systems of the 
candidate states has been prolonged into the period after accession for 
the new Member States. This ‘unprecedented power’106 of the Commission 
is only insignifi cantly107 mitigated by the fact that unlike the provision 
for temporary Internal Market safeguard measures, the member states 
must be consulted before such measures are adopted or before they are 
adapted, or by the fact that the Commission has to ‘inform the Council in 
good time’ before revoking the measures and ‘take duly into account any 
[of its] observations in this respect’. 
2. Ensuring compliance in the enlarged Union
With respect to the effective implementation and enforcement of EU 
law in the accession context and beyond, it is submitted that one deter-
minative factor of the Union’s ‘absorption’ or ‘integration capacity’ clearly 
relates to the imperative of ‘full administrative and judicial capacity’ of 
all Member States, and that effective national administrative and judicial 
structures constitute the basis for the functioning of the Community/
Union legal order in view of maintaining the momentum of European in-
tegration’. Indeed, in the light of an increasing emphasis on administra-
tive and judicial capacity of aspiring member states and concerns about 
104  European Commission (n 55).
105  Articles 39 and 38 of the 2003 and 2005 Acts of Accession, respectively.
106  Cf Hillion (n 42) 607.
107  Hillion in fact turns the argument of the limited ex-ante control of the Member States 
around, and would envisage the European Court of Justice’s jurisdiction with respect to 
safeguard measures dealing specifi cally with Title VI TEU considering the power of the Eu-
ropean Commission. Ibid 606.
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the lack thereof,108 it is arguably not a coincidence that the two areas in 
which the 2003 and 2005 Acts of Accession introduce specifi c safeguard 
mechanisms, are also the domains in which mutual recognition is the 
cornerstone of integration: the Internal Market and the Area of Freedom, 
Security and Justice. And while the Commission in 2002 declares full 
administrative and judicial capacity to be in general an ‘essential require-
ment for creating mutual trust among Member States, indispensable for 
membership,’109 it is particularly pertinent in these areas. 
A few lines on mutual recognition are thus appropriate. The scope 
for action in establishing and ensuring the smooth functioning of the 
internal market which was offered by the seminal judgment Cassis de 
Dijon in the late 1970’s was used to replace an early radical approach to 
market integration with a more mature approach far more respectful of 
national regulatory autonomy,110 and ultimately for national diversity.111 
In this policy domain, mutual recognition was offi cially recognised and 
identifi ed as the basic principle of the legal system of the Community.112 
In the area of Freedom, Security and Justice, emphasis on mutual recog-
nition in the Third pillar started in Tampere in 1999 where it was stated 
that ‘it should become the cornerstone of judicial co-operation in crimi-
nal matters’113 and was reiterated in the Hague Programme.114 Important 
108  Unsurprisingly, large parts of the Community pre-accession assistance have been pro-
grammed since the early 1990s to help candidates in their efforts to build and reinforce 
their administrative and judicial structures, and particular Action Plans (while this was not 
the case for other domains) drawn up in order to give new impetus to the candidates’ efforts. 
For an alternative proposal, which is not based on the so-called M&M solution (money and 
men), see Nicolaides (n 30) 43. 
109  European Commission (n 55). 
110  Cf JHH Weiler, ‘Mutual Recognition, Functional Equivalence and Harmonization in the 
Evolution of the European Common Market and the WTO’ in F Kostoris and T Padoa Schi-
oppa (eds), The Principle of Mutual Recognition in the European Integration Process (Palgrave, 
London 2005).
111  In the internal market, this in essence principle is the acceptance on the part of each 
Member State of any product which has been lawfully produced and marketed in another 
Member State, even if according to different technical or quality standards, in so far as it 
meet the legitimate objective which the legislation is designed to achieve. Cf A Mattera, ‘The 
Principle of Mutual Recognition and Respect for National, Regional and Local Identities and 
Traditions’ in F Kostoris and T Padoa Schioppa (n 110). 
112  Case C- 184/96 Commission v France (Foie gras) [1998] ECR I-6197. 
113  The original idea of applying this principle in the fi eld of criminal law was put forward 
by the UK in order to address concerns regarding the slow pace of improvement of judicial 
cooperation in criminal matters. Cf V Mitsilegas, ‘The Constitutional Implications of Mutual 
Recognition in Criminal Matters in the EU’ (2006) 43 CML Rev 1277, 1278.
114  See also European Commission, ‘Mutual Recognition of Final Decisions in Criminal 
Matters’ COM (2000) 495 fi nal, 26 July 2000. Among the measures adopted, the European 
Arrest Warrant, pushed through as ‘emergency legislation’ is certainly the best known and 
most contested example. The European Arrest Warrant is a judicial decision issued by a 
Member State with a view to the arrest and surrender by another Member States of an 
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differences not withstanding,115 the bottom line of mutual recognition in 
both internal market and criminal law is similar: one Member State is 
obliged to recognise an individual national standard, judgment or order 
adopted by other Member States’ respective authorities. 
By way of such recognition in individual cases, national enforcement 
authorities implicitly accept as legitimate the national regulatory, legal 
and justice system which has produced the judgment or standard in the 
fi rst place.116 Such acceptance, and ultimately the effi cient functioning 
of a single legal area is dependent upon a certain, basic, level of mutual 
trust among all entities, public and private, operating within this single 
legal space. This applies a fortiori in the context of measures adopted un-
der the third pillar, where Court orders and judgments may have a sub-
stantial impact on fundamental rights and concern guarantees against 
state intervention. The existence of clear and predictable criminal law 
principles and their rigorous application are essential to provide legal 
certainty in a society based on the rule of law.117 The fact that a persist-
ently high level of corruption in Bulgaria and Romania has been identi-
fi ed is thus of particular concern. 
This intrinsic link between mutual trust and adequate judicial and 
administrative structures should be seen in the larger context of an acquis 
which has reached a level of complexity that makes it diffi cult for current 
and future Member States alike to formally adopt and implement it, but 
particularly also to enforce it effectively. It has been argued that the ‘new 
challenge of compliance’ for the Union arising out of the single market 
individual for the purposes of conducting a criminal prosecution or executing a custodial 
sentence or detention order. It thus abolishes the principle of ‘dual criminality’ for certain 
crimes. Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on the European Arrest Warrant and 
the surrender procedures between Member States, [2002] OJ L190/1.
115  In the internal market total automaticity of recognition is avoided, for instance by a test 
of functional equality: prior to the actual recognition, national authorities have leeway to 
assess whether there is a level of functional equivalence between the respective national 
legal systems. In other words, the Member State of destination is required to accept prod-
ucts and services that satisfy the rules of the Member State of origin only provided that the 
product or service guarantees a level of protection and meets a legitimate objective equiva-
lent to the one required in the Member State of destination, and the level of protection is 
‘reasonable and satisfactory’ in so far as it complies with the results of scientifi c research in 
the sector. The minimum threshold is the one required by the Member State of destination; 
only Community minimum harmonisation can introduce a common threshold of protec-
tion for the legitimate objective being pursued. Cf A Mattera (n 111) 18. Peers argues that 
particularly when comparing the automaticity of the application of the principle, the anal-
ogy between the two domains is false, as while the internal market rules require at least a 
minimal degree of comparability, the abolition of dual criminality is intended to preclude 
such a comparability test. Cf S Peers, ‘Mutual recognition and criminal law in the European 
Union: Has the Council got it wrong?’ (2004) 41 CML Rev 5, 23.
116  Cf Mitsilegas (n 113) 1281.
117  Ibid 1280.
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programme of the 1990s has required an integration of the administra-
tive mechanisms applied by the Commission and the judicial measures 
administered by the Court of Justice.118 This has been reinforced through 
the fi fth enlargement round. Consequently then, the important concerns 
about effective compliance through effi cient public administrations may 
merely be considered an expression of a much broader phenomenon at 
the European Union level, in the sense that the ‘new’ tools of benchmark-
ing and post-accession conditionality - all of which encapsulate essential 
compliance concerns - de facto refl ect a compliance methodology that is 
spreading throughout many policy domains. 
It is indeed possible to argue that the European Commission has 
borrowed from accession methodology in its role as ‘guardian of the Trea-
ties’. In a 2002 communication, which interestingly was published on the 
same day as a communication on the institutional architecture,119 the 
Commission puts an important emphasis on improving cooperation be-
tween the Commission and the Member States with a view to preventing 
compliance failures.120 Notifi cation requirements and corresponding reg-
ular publication of statistics such as the Internal Market scoreboards,121 
and in particular the Annual Report on monitoring the application of 
Community law, arguably invoke comparison with the monitoring tools 
and techniques in the accession context. Indeed, a link is made122 by the 
Commission between accession monitoring and its Annual Reports is-
sued for all Member States, although the latter are essentially a ‘naming 
and shaming’ exercise, or in the words of the Commission one of ‘mutual 
monitoring’. In a similar vein, interpretative communications on a specif-
ic matter of Community primary and secondary law as well as technical 
advice and training sessions for representatives of national authorities 
resemble twinning programmes and guidance through detailed prescrip-
tions in Accession Partnerships and Action Plans. Accession methodol-
ogy is also generally visible in the way the Commission seeks dialogue 
and establishes communication channels with national implementing 
authorities and the judiciary. For instance it proposes that the so-called 
‘package meetings’, providing an opportunity to discuss with the com-
petent national authorities all infringements detected or suspected in a 
118  Cf F Snyder, ‘The Effectiveness of European Community Law: Institutions, Processes, 
Tools and Techniques’ (1993) 56 MLR 19.
119  European Commission, ‘For the European Union - Peace, Freedom and Solidarity, Com-
munication on the institutional architecture’ COM (2002) 728 fi nal, 11 December 2002. 
120  Cf European Commission, ‘Better Monitoring of the application of Community law’ COM 
(2002) 725 fi nal, 11 December 2002.
121  The Commission keeps regular scoreboards on the implementation of Directives by 
Member States, presented by State and by sector that allow for verifi cation directive by 
directive. 
122  Cf European Commission (n 55). 
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given sector, could be held at an earlier stage in order to seek early com-
pliance. In addition, the European Commission is increasingly involv-
ing itself with the implementation phase of directives. Its transposition 
guidelines and recommendations on transposition123 do, at times, argu-
ably come close to encroaching upon the autonomy of the Member States 
with respect to the enforcement of Community law already referred to. 
One may conclude that the Commission increasingly reaches out to the 
administrative and judicial authorities of the Member States. This is a 
practice that undoubtedly has gained pace and importance through and 
throughout the pre-accession strategies. 
In the absence of detailed primary law provisions, the Commission 
‘can use litigation as an element in developing its longer-term strategies’; 
litigation is but a part of ensuring compliance, ‘sometimes inevitable but 
nevertheless generally a minor part. […] It is in a position to use litiga-
tion in a continuous, proactive as well as reactive way, so as to cre-
ate counters, lay down conditions, or establish frameworks for negotia-
tion.’124 Indeed, the Commission’s discretion related to infringement pro-
ceedings125 should be seen in a much larger context, including the choice 
between soft means to encourage compliance126 and ‘hard’ compliance 
mechanisms. It is submitted that the Commission’s wide discretionary 
powers are justifi ed in terms of its enforcement function in general and 
the freedom it needs, for instance in preferring long-term over short-term 
goals.127 
In addition, the Article 226 ECT compliance mechanism is, especial-
ly in the enlarged Union, not without shortcomings - in particular with 
respect to number and length of proceedings (both administrative and 
judicial). To begin with, the Commission has - expressly in view of en-
largement - in its ‘institutional architecture’ communication128 acknowl-
edged a need for its compliance tools to be considerably strengthened. 
It has proposed that it should be given power to take decisions itself on 
123  Cf European Commission, ‘Recommendation on the transposition into national law of 
Directives affecting the internal market’ [2005] OJ L98. 
124  Snyder (n 118) 30-31, footnotes omitted.
125  The Commission has discretion within the fi rst administrative stage, for example to 
negotiate a compliance schedule, and also as to whether or not to bring the case before the 
Court of Justice, ie initiate the second and judicial phase, in case a Member State does not 
comply in time with a reasoned opinion. The Court of Justice has held that ‘the Commission 
is not obliged to act within a specifi ed period […]. The Commission is thus entitled to de-
cide, in its discretion, on what date it may be appropriate to bring an action and it is not for 
the Court to review the exercise of that discretion.’ Case C-422/92 Commission v Germany 
[1995] ECR I-1097 paras 16 and 18.
126  Cf Bieber and Vaerini (n 72) 401.
127  Cf Harlow (n 80) 73.
128  European Commission (n 119). 
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Union law infringements, in order to be provided with a basis for more 
effective ‘direct’ compliance checks in the Member States, and thus with 
a de facto investigatory function. Secondly, the question has to be asked 
to what extent the Commission is authorised to set up a selectivity policy 
in the treatment of infringement procedures. Does its discretion go as far 
as implementing a ‘generalised’ fi lter for certain types of complaints, and 
thus to ‘turning a blind eye’ to a certain types of alleged infringements? 
In the affi rmative, on the basis of what criteria could this selectivity be 
effectuated? Considering the imperative of adequate administrative and 
judicial structures for the implementation of all Community policies and 
in particular those based on mutual recognition, would it be possible to 
fi nd criteria that suffi ciently take that into account? Again, the particular 
diffi culty in ensuring domestic enforcement has to be recalled. Clearly 
such a selectivity policy raises questions that are diffi cult to tackle, yet 
alone solve, and in turn underline the importance of informal compliance 
mechanisms. Accession conditionality instruments largely refl ect such 
informal compliance mechanisms - even if they have become in part le-
gally enforceable. Whether these quasi-legal conditionality mechanisms 
of the pre-accession phase adequately fulfi l their role in a strictly post-
accession context remains to be seen. 
IV. Concluding remarks
Undoubtedly, the fi fth enlargement has changed the ‘constitutional 
fabric’129 of the European Union. This paper has been an endeavour not 
only to present the most recent developments in accession conditionality 
but also to put them in the broader context of the functioning of the en-
larged European Union in general, and the latter’s system of compliance 
mechanisms in particular. Thereby, the nature of the specifi c safeguard 
clauses in the 2003 and 2005 Acts of Accession as well as of the coopera-
tion and verifi cation mechanisms with respect to Bulgaria and Romania 
has been revealed as post-accession conditionality tools that invoke com-
parison with pre-accession conditionality methodology, in particular in 
terms of empowerment of the European Commission and preference of 
quasi-formal or quasi-legal monitoring and early compliance tools. The 
empowerment of the Commission is also an implication of the broad un-
derstanding of the notion ‘acquis communautaire’ in the enlargement con-
text, namely comprising ‘the content, principles and political objectives 
of the Treaties, including those of the Treaty on European Union’. The 
specifi c Justice and Home Affairs safeguard mechanisms in particular, 
have provided the Commission with ‘unprecedented power’ which is not 
129  B De Witte, ‘Enlargement and the EU Constitution’ in M Cremona (ed), The Enlargement 
of the European Union (OUP, Oxford 2003).
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only peculiar with respect to the domain, ie police cooperation in crimi-
nal matters, but also highly asymmetrical, in applying only to the new 
Member States. 
One might argue that this is in part justifi ed by the inherently inte-
grated nature of the accession process and the effi ciency thereof, in par-
ticular in order to transpose the remarkable and unprecedented system 
of ‘multi-layered conditionality’130 into the post-accession phase, on the 
basis of a rationale which seeks to protect current and future integration 
objectives. An objective and merits-based use of conditionality enables 
the European Union to lessen the negative implications of differentiation 
between the acceding states, but what place should (or should not) it 
have once accession has taken place? Shouldn’t the benefi ts of member-
ship be unconditional upon compliance with the acquis? After all, the 
post-accession conditionality mechanisms in concrete terms entail the 
exclusion of a new Member State and its citizens and economic operators 
from the benefi ts of membership in specifi c areas. Or does the overriding 
objective of peace and stability in Europe justify increasing differentiation 
among the Member States? Politically speaking, it would seem untenable 
to revert to safeguard measures directed against new Member States, if 
the ‘current’ Member States were not correctly implementing and fully 
enforcing the legal measure in question.131 Moreover, by taking parallel 
action against the ‘current’ Member States itself, the Commission could 
defuse differentiation or discrimination arguments, which in turn would 
help to built a ‘reputation’ for the specifi c safeguard mechanisms based 
on what they really are, namely an additional leverage for the Commis-
sion to achieve compliance with the acquis and administrative and judi-
cial capacity improvement. Nonetheless, it is not without repercussions 
when compliance failures increasingly are dealt with by means of infor-
mal, administrative enforcement procedures at the expense of judicial 
enforcement procedures; especially in view of the supplementary purpose 
of the formal infringement procedure, namely the uniform application of 
Community law. Informal, soft and other compliance mechanisms cer-
tainly fulfi l that aim with less authority. 
On the other hand, it has also been seen that these various new com-
pliance mechanisms inspired by the accession strategies have sparked a 
kind of spill-over effect with respect to enforcement procedures within 
the European Union in general. The fi fth enlargement has provided for 
an opportunity to experiment with new methods for securing compliance, 
complementary to the traditional infringement proceedings. Thus, the 
Union’s involvement in new Member states’ administrative structures 
130  Cremona and Hillion (n 91) 8. 
131  Cf Inglis (n 42) 957.
304 Martina Spernbauer: Benchmarking, Safeguard Clauses and Verifi cation Mechanisms...
cannot be seen as a limited practice, but rather presages a more funda-
mental evolution. And while a ‘transfer of methodology’ might not be de-
fendable in all instances, it can hardly be doubted that the imperative of 
effective acquis enforcement through effi cient and adequate administra-
tive structures has gained momentum in view of the fi fth enlargement. 
One may ask whether the shift from predominantly positive pre-ac-
cession conditionality to a clearly negative post-accession conditionality 
is desirable. It is submitted that this shift in approach has its basis in 
the nature of both the accession process and the functioning of negative 
conditionality. Suffi ce to recall that while in the pre-accession phase the 
negative implications of burdensome reforms may be discounted against 
the aggregate benefi ts of eventual membership, making positive condi-
tionality an effective tool, the Union no longer has such leverage in the 
post-accession phase. The considerable delay in necessary reforms in the 
judicial systems of Bulgaria and Romania illustrate this, with the quasi-
agreed date of entry for these countries undoubtedly having contributed 
to the necessity of adopting a cooperation and verifi cation mechanism in 
this regard. As to the nature and functioning of negative conditionality, 
the fact that the specifi c safeguard mechanisms, legally enshrined in pri-
mary law, barely have been used132 corresponds to the very rare invoca-
tion of essential element clauses in international agreements with third 
states. In the post-accession context too, the value of legally enforceable 
negative conditionality tools is of a primarily symbolic nature.
Within an ‘ever closer Union’, the principle of loyal cooperation, en-
shrined in Article 10 ECT and underpinned by institutional enforcement 
mechanisms and non-reciprocity, is the legal expression of solidarity and 
mutual trust, whose continuing presence at all levels is indispensable for 
maintaining the momentum of European integration. We are certainly 
justifi ed in wondering then whether this principle is suffi ciently strong to 
ensure cooperation and mutual trust in a post-accession situation where 
the diffi cult balance between inclusiveness and differentiation has been 
carried over from the pre-accession period. Are not the post-accession 
conditionality tools encroaching upon the essential premise of mutual 
trust even if their introduction was intended to avoid that? After all, in 
a ‘Community of laws’ built on common rules, the achievement of its 
purpose is - in view of the integration model that Europe has adhered to 
- dependent on each member’s judicial and administrative capacity. One 
132  On 27 June 2007, the European Commission presented its report on the progress made 
by Bulgaria and Romania in meeting the benchmarks, pursuant to Art 2 of Commission 
Decisions 2006/929/EC and 2006/929/EC (n 64). While criticising the countries in failing 
to meet the benchmarks, especially those on anti-corruption , the Commission refrained 
from invoking the safeguard clauses. <www.euobserver.com> accessed 27 June 2007. This 
paper had to be fi nalised before the publication of the report itself. 
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might wonder then why refl ections on the European Union’s ‘absorption’ 
or ‘integration capacity’ have - at least from the offi cial side - merely been 
focused on creating the ‘institutional conditions for ensuring the proper 
functioning of the Union’. This quote from the 1994 Essen European 
Council indeed is no exception. Referral to the ‘absorption capacity’ in 
Presidency Conclusions133 has been limited to institutional aspects. But 
even in this respect, the ‘Amsterdam leftovers’ in relation to institutional 
reform were only narrowly been agreed in the Nice Treaty, completing ‘the 
institutional changes necessary for the accession of new Member States’. 
The latter, while recognising the need for further institutional debate, 
did not ‘guarantee any continued momentum towards integration.’134 The 
positive Irish referendum result in October 2002 then could not - while 
consolidating the institutional enlargement adaptations - bring an end 
to the issue of the Union’s condition for enlargement - ie its ‘integration 
capacity’. Despite the ongoing procedural and substantial clarifi cation 
of the conditions for accession as regards aspiring Member States - with 
the latest and so far most signifi cant step having been introduced in the 
benchmarking of the opening and closure of acquis accession negotia-
tion chapters - the unpredictability of the accession process will persist 
in the enlargement condition applicable to the Union itself. And while 
the empowerment of the European Commission has both been a neces-
sity and a consequence of the multi-faceted pre-accession strategies that 
paralleled the accession negotiations, it cannot provide suffi cient support 
for attaining ‘integration capacity’, the Union’s enlargement condition, in 
particular if the latter to a large extent consists of - as has been argued 
- the effective enforcement of the acquis through full administrative and 
judicial capacity of all Member States. The recognition that enlargement 
increasingly changes the Union by affecting its constitutional balance 
and calling into question its compliance mechanisms, is a sign of neces-
sary refl ection on the Union’s functioning and the ‘integration capacity’ 
condition. The recent Commission communication in this respect135 fo-
cuses mainly on institutions, common policies and the European Union 
budget and is thus an insuffi cient response, although the Commission 
draws the right conclusions on what is in its competence and capacity to 
achieve.136
133  For a detailed account, see G Edwards, ‘Reforming the Union’s Institutional Framework: 
A New EU obligation?’ in C Hillion (ed), EU Enlargement - A Legal Approach (Hart Publishing, 
Portland 2004) 23.
134  Ibid 36.
135  Cf European Commission (n 34). 
136  It is relatively powerless in addressing the root problem of mutual trust between the 
Member States. 
306 Martina Spernbauer: Benchmarking, Safeguard Clauses and Verifi cation Mechanisms...
Eventually it will become essential to address the question of wheth-
er the European Union, by extending accession conditionality tools in-
creasingly into the post-accession phase, risks unacceptable differen-
tiation among its Members States, which at some point may no longer 
be confi ned to compliance mechanisms. Considering that avoiding new 
dividing lines in Europe has been the most legitimate aim in the fi fth 
enlargement, in excluding any partial membership or privileged partner-
ship considerations, the alternative, namely expressly offering a differ-
ent kind of relation- or membership to third states, might then become 
worth reconsidering, or even preferable for aspiring members. Clearly, 
the European Union needs to come to terms with the internal effects of 
its most successful foreign policy so far. For the sake of the effectiveness 
and uniform application of Community law in those areas that constitute 
essential parts of European integration today, and thus the integrity of 
the Community legal order, these refl ections constitute an unavoidable 
imperative in the future.
